This paper studies mandatory job-search periods for welfare applicants. During this period the benefits application is put on hold and the applicant is obliged to make job applications. We combine a randomized experiment with detailed administrative data to investigate the effects of imposing a job-search period. We find strong and persistent effects on the probability to collect welfare benefits. The reduced benefits are fully compensated by increased earnings from work. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of adverse consequences for the most vulnerable applicants.

This paper follows an alternative approach to identify the wage effects of private-sector training. The idea is to narrow down the comparison group by only taking into consideration the workers who wanted to participate in training but did not do so because of some random event. This makes the comparison group increasingly similar to the group of participants in terms of observed individual characteristics and the characteristics of (planned) training events.

In an evaluation of a job-training program, the influence of the program on the individual earnings capacity is important, because it reflects the program effect on human capital. Estimating these effects is complicated because earnings are observed for employed individuals only, and employment is itself an outcome of the program. Point identification of these effects can only be achieved by usually implausible assumptions. Therefore, weaker and more credible assumptions are suggested that bound various average and quantile effects.

We use the regional and time variation of training grants in Italy to identify the causal effect of (formal continuing vocational) training on earnings. We estimate log-linear earnings regressions with constant marginal returns to training and find that one additional week of training increases monthly net earnings by 1.36%, substantially less than the 3% or more often found in the literature. Estimated returns vary significantly by firm size, and range from 0.40% in firms with more than 100 employees to 2.51% in smaller firms, the bulk of the Italian private sector.

While numerous studies have provided selectivity-corrected estimates of the wage returns to training both in the US and in European countries, less is known about the impact of training on mobility on the labour market. In this paper, we estimate the impact of firmprovided training on both the employment-unemployment and job-to-job transitions using French panel data covering the 1998-2000 period.

A long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-ended contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-ended contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002.

We evaluate the potential of wage subsidy programs for reducing non-employment of the disabled by exploiting a reform of the Danish Flexjob scheme targeted towards employing the long-term (partially) disabled. Firms received a salary reimbursement for all employees granted a Flexjob. We examine whether a change from full to partial reimbursement to governmental units affected the share of Flexjobs allocated to retained (insiders) versus non-employed hirees (outsiders).

Low-wage subsidies are often proposed as a solution to the unemployment problem among the low skilled but the empirical evidence on their effects is still scarce. This paper examines the employment effects of a Finnish payroll tax subsidy scheme, which is targeted at the employers of older, full-time, low-wage workers. The system's clear eligibility criteria open up an opportunity for a reliable estimation of the causal impacts of the subsidy scheme.

We re-analyze the effects of a Danish active labor market programme social experiment, which included a range of sub-treatments, including meetings with caseworkers, job search assistance courses, and activation programmes. We use newly developed non-parametric methods to examine how the effects of the experimental treatment vary during the unemployment spell. Non-parametric techniques are important from a methodological point of view, since parametric/distributional assumptions are in conflict with the concept of experimental evidence.

Training programs for the unemployed typically involve teaching specific skills in demand amongst employers. In 1997, Swedish unemployed could also choose general training at the upper secondary school level. Despite the dominance of programs offering specific training, long-term relative earnings effects of general vs. specific training are theoretically ambiguous. Analyzing detailed administrative data 1990-2010, we find specific training associated with higher earnings in the short run, but that earnings converge over time.